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PART ONE

"Itis revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." Oliver
Wendell Holmes, THE PATH OF THE LAW (1897).

I.

INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF ARTICLE

The so-called "doctrine of after-acquired title" deals with the
rights of a grantee (and his successors) who accepts a deed or other
conveyance from a grantor then without title, but who thereafter
acquires it. The problem asserts itself in many areas of the law:
mortgages and other voluntary liens on real property, conveyances
and voluntary liens by a married woman of her separate property,
conveyances and liens on the homestead community property by
the husband, rights of adverse possessors claiming through deeds,
rights of creditors of the grantor, and the interrelation of rights of
a purchaser as affected by the recording acts.'
1 (a) Mortgages and voluntary liens: Clark v. Gauntt, 138 Tex. 558, 161 S.W.2d 270
(1942); Willis v. Smith, 72 Tex. 565 (1889); Galloway v. Mosser, 82 S.W.2d 1067 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1935); Shamburger Lumber Co. v. Bredthaver, 62 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933); Dearing v. Jordan, 130 S.W. 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) error dism.; Anderson v.
Casey-Swasey Co., 120 S.W. 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909), rev'd on other grounds, 103 Tex.
466, 129 S.W. 349 (1910); Masterson v. Burnett, 66 S.W. 90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901)
error ref. (b) Husband and wife, community and separate property-conveyances and voluntary liens: Irion v. Mills, 41 Tex. 310 (1874); Dearing v. Jordan, 130 S.W. 876 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1910) error dism.; Marble v. Marble, 114 S.W. 871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908);
Wooten v. Pennock, 114 S.W. 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908); Colonial & United States Mortg.
Co. v. Thetford, 66 S.W. 103 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901); Stallings v. Hullum, 33 S.W. 1033
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Consider the following: 0 conveys Blackacre to A by warranty
deed at a time when 0 has no title. Subsequent to the conveyance,
0 acquires title. Although the Texas courts generally have held that
A can acquire O's after-required title and is not limited to damages
in a suit for breach of warranty, a study of the cases will demonstrate
a wide variation by the courts in their definition and consistency of
application of the rationale used to determine the rights of competing parties to an after-acquired title:
1. A is given title on the basis of a covenant of warranty contained in the deed (express or implied) to prevent a circuitry of
action on the covenant (hereinafter referred to as the "warranty
cases") .

2. A is given title on the basis that 0 is estopped to deny the title he
purported to convey to A (hereinafter referred to as the "estoppel
cases").'
(Tex. Civ. App. 1895); Wadkins v. Watson, 21 S.W. 636, rev'd, 86 Tex. 194, 24 S.W.
385 (1893); Randolph v. Junker, 21 S.W. 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1892). (c) Rights of
creditors: Taylor v. Huck & Co., 65 Tex. 238 (1885); Ackerman v. Smiley, 37 Tex. 211
(1872); Newton v. Easterwood, 154 S.W. 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) error ref.; Anderson
v. Casey-Swasey Co., 120 S.W. 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) rev'd on other grounds, 103
Tex. 446, 129 S.W. 349 (1910); Masterson v. Burnett, 66 S.W. 90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901),
error ref.; Hale v. Hollon, 35 S.W. 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896), rehearing denied, 36
S.W. 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896), aff'd, 90 Tex. 427, 39 S.W. 287 (1897). (d) Adverse possessors: Houston Oil Co. v. Moss, 155 Tex. 157, 284 S.W.2d 131 (1955);
Adams v. Duncan, 147 Tex. 332, 215 S.W.2d 599 (1948); Greene v. White, 137
Tex. 361, 153 S.W.2d 575 (1941); Thomas v. Southwestern Settlement & Dev. Co., 131
S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dism., judgm. cor. (e) Effect of Yecording acts:
Benge v. Scharbauer, 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953); Caswell v. Llano Oil Co.,
120 Tex. 139, 36 S.W.2d 208 (1931); Williams v. Cook, 282 S.W. 574 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1926); Leonard v. Benford Lumber Co., 110 Tex. 83, 216 S.W. 382 (1919); Breen
v. Moorehead, 126 S.W. 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910), aff'd, 104 Tex. 254, 136 S.W. 1047
(1911); Simon v. Stearns, 43 S.W. 50 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) error ref.; Hale v. Hollon,
36 S.W. 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896), aff'd, 90 Tex. 427, 39 S.W. 287 (1897).
'McMahon v. Christmann, 157 Tex. 403, 303 S.W.2d 341 (1957); Gibson v. Turner,
156 Tex. 289, 294 S.W.2d 781 (1956); Benge v. Scharbauer, 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d
166 (1953); Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940);
Barroum v. Culmell, 90 Tex. 93, 37 S.W. 313 (1896); Wadkins v. Watson, 86 Tex. 194,
24 S.W. 385 (1893); Richardson v. Powell, 83 Tex. 588, 19 S.W. 262 (1892); Fretelliere
v. Hindes, 57 Tex. 392 (1882); Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255 (1875); Ackerman v.
Smiley, 37 Tex. 211 (1872); Gould v. West, 32 Tex. 339 (1869); Brateman v. Upper
Channel Site Co., 378 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. s.r.e.; Seydler v.
Herder, 361 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.; Farmers Royalty Holding
Co. v. Hahn, 187 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945), aff'd, 144 Tex. 312, 190 S.W.2d
60 (1945); Talley v. Howsley, 170 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943), aff'd, 142 Tex.
81, 176 S.W.2d 158 (1943); Wilson v. Wilson, 118 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938);
Robinson v. Jacobs, 241 S.W. 241 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd, 113 Tex. 231, 254 S.W. 309
(1923); Green v. West Texas Coal Mining & Dev. Co., 225 S.W. 548 (Tex. Civ. App.
1920) error ref.; Zarate v. Villareal, 155 S.W. 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) error ref.;
Dearing v. Jordan, 130 S.W. 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) error dism.; Frey v. Meyers, 113
S.W. 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
'Sharpe v. Fowler, 151 Tex. 490, 252 S.W.2d 153 (1952); Adams v. Duncan, 147
Tex. 332, 215 S.W.2d 599 (1948); Talley v. Howsley, 142 Tex. 81, 176 S.W.2d 158
(1943); Lindsay v. Freeman, 83 Tex. 259, 18 S.W. 727 (1892); Willis v. Smith, 72 Tex.
565 (1889); Parker v. Campbell, 21 Tex. 763 (1858); Box v. Lawrence, 14 Tex. 545
(1855); Wilson v. Beck, 286 S.W. 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) error ref.; Donnell v. Otts,
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3. A is given title on the basis of an estoppel against 0 created by
the presence of a covenant of warranty (express or implied) contained in the deed (hereinafter referred to as the "warranty-estoppel"
cases)

."

4. A is given title where it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the underlying theory of the case. Unfortunately, this category
includes several of the most extensively cited cases in this field.'
Seemingly the Texas courts have felt free to apply a "grab-bag"
rationale, i.e., a theoretical basis suited to the achievement of a just
result in a particular case.' However, this variation as to the basis of
230 S.W. 864 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Pritchard v. Fox, 154 S.W. 1058 (Tex. Civ. App.
1913); Anderson v. Casey-Swasey Co., 120 S.W. 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909), rev'd on
other grounds, 103 Tex. 466, 129 S.W. 349 (1910); Lowry v. Carter, 102 S.W. 930 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1907) error ref.; Scates v. Fohn, 59 S.W. 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900); Garrett v.
McClain, 44 S.W. 47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898); Dupree v. Frank, 39 S.W. 988 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1897); Randolph v. Junker, 21 S.W. 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1892).
'Clark v. Gauntt, 138 Tex. 558, 161 S.W.2d 270 (1942); Harne v. Smith, 79 Tex.
310, 15 S.W. 240 (1891); Wilson v. Wilson, 118 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938);
Robinson v. Jacobs, 241 S.W. 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), aff'd, 113 Tex. 231, 254 S.W. 309
(1923); Dearing v. Jordan, 130 S.W. 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) error dism.; Frey v. Myers, 113 S.W. 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908); Morris v. Housley, 34 S.W. 659 (Tex. Civ. App.
1896); Jenkins v. Adcock, 27 S.W. 21 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893).
'Burns v. Goodrich, 392 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 1965); Clark v. Gauntt, 138 Tex. 558,
161 S.W.2d 270 (1942); Baldwin v. Root, 90 Tex. 546, 40 S.W. 3 (1897) (a much-cited
case); Robinson v. Douthit, 64 Tex. 101 (1885); Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255 (1875);
Ackerman v. Smiley, 37 Tex. 211 (1872); Gould v. West, 32 Tex. 339 (1869); Texas
Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Fox, 228 S.W. 1021 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Breen v. Moorehead,
126 S.W. 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910), aff'd, 104 Tex. 254, 136 S.W. 1047 (1911); Lowry
v. Carter, 102 S.W. 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) error ref.; Dupree v. Frank, 39 S.W. 994
(Tex. Civ. App. 1897). For an illustrative example of costly litigation and even more costly
consequences, see the series of confusing and not necessarily instructive cases in the oil and
gas field, beginning with Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 508, 144 S.W.2d 878
(1940), followed by Benge v. Scharbauer, 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953); Gibson
v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289, 294 S.W.2d 781 (1956); and culminating with McMahon v.
Christmann, 157 Tex. 403, 303 S.W.2d 341 (1957).
0
For instance compare the opinion of the court in Gould v. West, 32 Tex. 339 (1869)
with Lindsey v. Freeman, 83 Tex. 259, 18 S.W. 727 (1892). Wadkins v. Watson, 86 Tex.
194, 24 S.W. 386 (1893); Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 508, 144 S.W.2d
878 (1940); and McMahon v. Christmann, 157 Tex. 403, 303 S.W.2d 341 (1957).
It would seem that A's rights as to O's later acquired title could differ, depending upon
the theoretical approach of the court. For example, if A's right is contractual in nature,
based upon a breach of a covenant of warranty: (a) A's cause of action would be one of
specific performance against 0 to acquire the legal title. Prior to judgment would O's creditors without notice be able to reach Blackacre? It would also seem that A's cause of action
would be barred under the four-year statute, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. articles 5529,
5531. As to equitable rights, see Deaton v. Rush, 113 Tex. 176, 252 S.W. 1025 (1923).
Virtually all warranty cases state title passes "eo instante" or ignore the problem. See Baldwin
v. Root, 90 Tex. 546, 40 S.W. 3 (1897); Gould v. West, 32 Tex. 339 (1869); Caswell v.
Llano Oil Co., 120 Tex. 139, 36 S.W.2d 208 (1931); Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Fox,
228 S.W. 1021 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Newton v. Easterwood, 154 S.W. 646 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1913) error ref.; Lowry v. Carter, 102 S.W. 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) error ref.;
(b) A would have no right where a cause of action for breach of warranty did not exist.
But see Robinson v. Douthit, 64 Tex. 101 (1885); Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289, 294
S.W.2d 781 (1956), where after-acquired title passed to the grantee on the theory of covenant of warranty where no consideration was paid or substantial breach of covenant warranty
existed; and Morris v. Short, 151 S.W. 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). However, in Fretelliere
v. Hindes, 57 Tex. 392 (1882), a release of warranty destroyed grantee's right to after-
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decision is also due, in part, to the paucity of source law available to
the courts during the Republic and early years of statehood, and
misconceptions concerning the historical basis for acquisition of afteracquired title as it existed in England prior to the colonization of
the United States.
II.

ANTECEDENTS

A. Early Texas Cases And Common Law Roots
The earliest Texas case found by the author stating that afteracquired title will inure to the benefit of a vendee is Mays v. Lewis,8
decided in 1849. No supporting authorities are cited by the court. By
1892 the Texas courts had delivered at least twelve opinions concerning after-acquired title in a variety of situations where the basis for
the decision was neither mentioned nor discussed.!
acquired title. (c) A would have no right where the deed through which he claimed was
without covenants, express or implied. But see Lindsay v. Freeman, 83 Tex. 259, 18 S.W.
727 (1892); Garrett v. McClain, 44 S.W. 47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898); Dupree v. Frank, 39
S.W. 994 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894); where after-acquired title passed under deed without
warranty. (d) The rights of A's assigns would depend upon the assignability of a chose in
action, i.e., the right to enforce a breach of covenant of warranty.
On the other hand, if A's right is based upon an estoppel of 0 to deny the statements
contained in his deed that title had passed to A: (a) A would be automatically vested with
O's legal title and could enforce his title by suit in trespass to try title, being limited only
by the three, five, ten and twenty-five-year statutes pertaining to adverse possession of land,
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5507, 5509, 5510, 5519 and 5519a. (b) It should be immaterial that no covenant was contained in the conveyance, that no cause of action for breach
of warranty existed, and that no consideration was paid. (c) However, knowledge of the outstanding title by the grantee might prevent estoppel from arising. But see Gould v. West,
32 Tex. 339 (1869); Surtees v. Hobson, 4 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), apparently
to the effect knowledge of the grantee will not prevent the estoppel.
Of some sixteen cases decided by the Texas courts prior to Lindsay v. Freeman, 83
Tex. 259, 18 S.W. 727 (1892), the court there cited only the following cases from other
jurisdictions (the United States, seven states, and England) : Irvine v. Irvine, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 617 (1869); French v. Spencer, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 228 (1858); Van Rensselear v.
Kearney, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 325 (1850); Bush v. Marshall, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 284 (1848);
Carver v. Jackson, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 1 (1830); Mitchell v. Winslow, 17 Fed. Cas. 527
(1843); Tremble v. State, 4 Blackf. 437 (Ind. 1837); Logan v. Steele's Heirs, 4 B. Mon.
433 (Ky. 1827); Cutler v. Dickinson, 8 Pick. 386 (Mass. 1829); Chapman v. Searle, 3
Pick. 38 (Mass. 1825); Nixon's Heirs v. Carco's Heirs, 28 Miss. 414 (1854); Wark v.
Willard, 13 N.H. 389 (1843); Jackson v. Parkhurst, 9 Wend. 209 (N.Y. 1832); Jackson
v. Winslow, 9 Cow. 13 (N.Y. 1828); McWilliams v. Nisly, 2 S. & R. 507 (Pa. 1816);
Bonner v. Wilkinson, 106 Eng. Rep. 1340 (1822). Few of the cases are in point concerning
after-acquired title, most dealing with estoppel by receipts and recitals.
Of these cases only Van Rensselear v. Kearney is of substance. It is a landmark case on
after-acquired title and although cited twice by Texas courts, it was virtually ignored until
Lindsay v. Freeman in 1892.
84 Tex. 38 (1849). Also see Langford v. Republic, Dallas, Texas Reports 588 (1844).
'Lindsay v. Freeman, 83 Tex. 259, 18 S.W. 727 (1892); Willis v. Smith, 72 Tex. 565
(1889); Taylor v. Huck & Co., 65 Tex. 238 (1885); Robinson v. Douthit, 64 Tex. 101
(1885); Fretelliere v. Hindes, 57 Tex. 392 (1882); Pitman v. Henry, 50 Tex. 357 (1878);
Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255 (1875); Ackerman v. Smiley, 37 Tex. 211 (1872); Gould
v. West, 32 Tex. 339 (1869); Parker v. Campbell, 21 Tex. 763 (1858); Box v. Lawrence,
14 Tex. 545 (1855); and Mays v. Lewis, 4 Tex. 38 (1849).
It is interesting to note that three were warranty cases: Ackerman v. Smiley, Pitman v.
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These early Texas cases contain few citations to other jurisdictions." No citations are found to Spanish or Mexican authorities, 1
and the only English case noted does not deal with an after-acquired
title. 2 In the cases by the Texas courts only two references are found
to English law."3 One significant reference is to Coke on Littleton:"
Litt. Sect. 446.
Also, these words which are commonly put in such Releases, s. (quae
quovismodo in futurum habere potero) are as voide in Law; for no
right passeth by a Release, but the right which the Releasor hath at the
time of the Release made. For if there be Father and Sonne, and the
Father bee disseised, and the Sonne (living his Father) releaseth by his
deed to the disseisor all the right which he hath or may have in the
same tenements without clause of warrantie, &c. and after the Father
dieth, &c. the Sonne may lawfully enter upon the possession of the Dis-

seisor, for that hee had no right in the land in his father's life, but the
right descended to him after the Release made by the death of his Father,
&c... ..

Coke's Comment on Sect. 446.
Sans clause de garrantie. For if there been a warrantie annexed to the
Release, then the Son shall be barred. For albeit the Release cannot barre
the right for the cause aforesaid, yet the warrantie may rebutt, and barre
him and his heires of a future right which was not in him at that time:
and the reason (which in all cases is to be sought out) wherefore a warrantie being a Covenant reall should barre a future right, is for avoiding a circuitie of action (which is not favoured in Law); as he that
made the warrantie should recover the Land against the ter-Tenant,
and he by force of the warrantie to have as much in value against the
same person: yet is there a diversity betweene a Warrantie and a Feoffment; for if there be Grandfather, Father, and Son, and the Father disHenry, Fretelliere v. Hindes, four were estoppel cases: Box v. Lawrence, Parker v. Campbell,
Willis v. Smith, Lindsay v. Freeman; three were of uncertain rationale: Gould v. West,
Harrison v. Boring, Robinson v. Douthit; and two were bare of rationale or citation of authorities: Lewis v. Mays, and Taylor v. Huck. In only four of the cases did the courts attempt serious explanation of the basis for decision: Gould, Harrison, Douthit and Lindsay. All
four have been cited reepatedly; unfortunately, however, in the first three the court showed
much uncertainty.
10See cases cited note 7 supra.
'1 It appears that the only action for failure to deliver the title contracted for was in
damages: See SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO art. 608-14, at 133 (1851);
KERR, A HANDBOOK OF MEXICAN LAW 50 (1909); DOMAT, CIVIL LAW, tit. 2, § 10 (1850).

"aBonner v. Wilkinson, 106 Eng. Rep. 1340 (1822), which dealt with estoppel to deny
place of residence as recited in a writ.
'aCOKE ON LITTLETON (1794) (hereinafter cited as Co. LITT.) § 446, cited by the
court in Jackson v. Winslow, 9 Cow. 18 (N.Y. 1828), which in turn is found in the
Texas case of Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255

(1875).

In Van Rensselear v. Kearney, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 325 (1850), is found a fairly thorough
analysis of the doctrine of after-acquired title as traced from English authorities. However,
it is strange that the Texas court virtually ignored it until Lindsay v. Freeman, 83 Tex.
259, 18 S.W. 727 (1892), wherein it was adopted as the rationale for decision. It is cited
in Willis v. Smith, 72 Tex. 565 (1889).
14Co. LITT. § 446, at 265a-b.
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seiseth the Grandfather, and make a feoffment in fee, the Grandfather
dieth, the Father against his owne feoffment shall not enter; but if he
die, his son shall enter. And so note a diversity between a Release, a Feoffment, and a Warrantie: a Release in that case is void; a feoffment is
good against the feoffor, but not against his heire; a warrantie is good
both against himselfe and his heires.
There is no doubt that this is the source of the oft-repeated statement of the courts that after-acquired title is passed to the grantee

in a deed containing a covenant of warranty to prevent a circuitry
of action on the covenant. For instance, two early Texas court opinions (warranty cases) contain the following:
But, in addition to all this, there is covenant of warranty in the deed
against the heirs. In such cases the principle is, if the ancestor has
wrongfully conveyed the land, with warranty, to make the covenant
operate as a rebutter to the claim of the heirs to whom the assets descended, and thereby prevent circuity of action. Because, if they hold
the land, which is real assets, it should be, in honesty and justice, subjected to the payment of damages for the breach of the covenant of
warranty. For, if the land is recovered from the covenantee, he has his
right of action to recover from the heirs upon the covenant of warranty.
The heirs being estopped by the deed of the ancestor to deny his title,
they are equally concluded by the express and sound recitals in the
deed.1"
and,
Where the deed assumes to convey the land and not merely the title,
such as it is that the vendor has in it, and there is a general warranty,
the deed not only imports a bona fide conveyance in reference to the
subject of the sale and purchase designed thereby to be vested in the
purchaser, but it will carry any after-purchased rights or title that may
be acquired by the vendor, thereby avoiding a circuity of action on the
general warranty."6
The rationale of the courts in warranty cases may be paraphrased
as follows: When (1) the deed (or other conveyance) contains an
express covenant of warranty, or (2) a covenant of warranty may
be implied by statute from the words of grant, then (3) any interest
thereafter acquired by the grantor will be given to the grantee to
avoid a circuity of action on the covenant.
In predicating such a result on Lord Coke's statement, the following assumptions or implications must also be made and sustained:
"5Gould v. West, 32 Tex. 339, 353 (1869).
0

" Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255, 261 (1875). Also notice similar language in Bush
v. Marshall, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 284 (1848), and French v. Spencer, 62 U.S. (21 How.)
228 (1858). See also Jackson v. Winslow, 9 Cow. 18 (N.Y. 1828), cited by Texas courts
prior to 1892.
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1. The warranty discussed by Lords Littleton and Coke is the
same as that today known in Texas as a covenant of warranty. 2.
Statement (3) above, must mean that if a "circuity of action" is
to be avoided (a) the grantor is bound on the covenant of warranty
so that it may be enforced against him, and (b) an enforceable cause
of action exists in favor of the grantee - for without both, no
action by the grantor could be resisted by the grantee on the basis
of an enforceable covenant, thereby producing a circuity of action.
3. An action for damages is not the only proper remedy in this situation.
B. Coke's Warranty
There is little doubt that the warranty referred to by Coke is not
the covenant of warranty used in modern conveyances, but the
ancient warranty of common law.1"

1. Pre-Norman Mists
The first mention of anything akin to warranty to land appears
in England soon after the Norman Conquest in conveyances containing a mention of the consent of an heir expectant."8 Supposedly, the
attempt of an alienor to bind his heirs grew out of the struggle for
supremacy in Normany, prior to and at the time of the Norman Conquest (1066 A.D.), between two systems of descent, one being the
policy of the law that equality should be maintained among sons,
17 VII Co. LITT.

384b, 385a; HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 256; RAWLE,

COVENANTS FOR TITLE, ch. 1 (5th ed.); 1 THOMAS, COKE ON LITTLETON 199 N.A.; and
II BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 301 (1807), where it was said:

By the feodal constitution, if the vassal's title to enjoy the feud was indisputed
he might vouch, or call the lord or donor to warrant on insure his gift; which
if he failed to do, the vassal was evicted, the lord was bound to give him
another feud of equal value in recompense. And so, by our ancient law, if
before the statute of quia emptores a man enfeoffed another in fee, by the
feodal verb dedi to hold himself and his heirs by certain services; the law
annexed a warranty to this grant, which found the feoffer and his heirs, to
whom the services (which were the consideration and equivalent for the gift),
were originally stipulated to be rendered. Or if a man and his ancestors had
immemorially holden land of another and his ancestors by the service of
homage (which was called homage auncestrel), this also bound the lord to
warranty; the homage being an evidence of such a feodal grant.
18 Reference is here made to transfers of a freehold interest in land. Although, prior to
the Norman Conquest, land on the continent could be passed by symbolic delivery, and
there is some evidence that such a transfer could be made by instrument alone under AngloSaxon law, at least as regards the so-called "book-land"; after the conquest the mode of
transfer of land reverted to methods of antiquity, i.e., the transfer of the thing itself. See
II POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 87, 250-52 (1923); III HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 221-222 (1956). As is commonly known this was
referred to as "livery-of-seisin"; however, a writing could be made to serve as a memorandum of the transfer. And see PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 526
(1929); VII GLANVILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE KINGDOM OF
ENGLAND 114 (1187) (Beames' transl. 1900).
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and the other being the system of primogeniture, where the eldest
son would take to the exclusion of others sons or daughters."9
The early writer Glanvill indicated that under the policy of equality
of descent it was improper, and perhaps illegal, for an ancestor to
alienate more than a "reasonable amount" of land to a third party,
which would effect a disinheritance of his heirs or to prefer one son
to the disadvantage of the others."
By the thirteenth century the rule of primogeniture as to descent of
land, and the concept of freedom of alienation of land was in ascendancy in England. In the development of freedom of alienation, with
the ability to move land from family ownership into commerce, it
apparently became the custom of the alienor to attempt by recitals
to bind his heirs expectant in order to avoid the restriction on conveying lands that may have existed under the former Anglo-Saxon system of equality of descent. It is thought that this recital later became
the clause of warranty whereby the alienor bound himself and his
heirs to warrant the alienee against all men. The result was that the
ancestor could alienate the land free of the claim of his heirs, and,
if a warranty existed, the burden of it would fall upon the eldest
son, so that he could no longer claim the inheritance from his father.2"
2. Feudal Relationships and the Common Law Warranty
The feudal warranty originally existed in law without the necessity
of a writing (lands being transferable by transfer of possession, i.e.,
livery of seisin) and was inherent in the feudal concept of homage. 2
The feudal relationship of lord and vassal was reciprocal in nature,
the vassal owing services to the lord and the latter owing a duty to
protect the vassal in his fief. In what has been termed the earliest
" PLUCKNETT 527-529.
VII GLANVILL 1; PLUCKNETT 527. Also see II POLLOCK AND MAITLAND 253-254.
21111 HOLDSWORTH 196, 230. In the author's note to Beames' GLANVILL 1, a diversity

20

of opinion is demonstrated as to the origin of "warranty":
Warrantum. Sir Henry Seplman is inclined to derive this Term from the Saxon
Primitive War, arma, telum, defensio, etc. Dr. Sullivan tells us, it was derived
from War, because in real Actions, the Trial was of old by Combat. Dr.
Cowell, however, prefers deriving warrantia from the French garantie or
garant. The Doctor notices the stipulatio of the Civilians, but, as he observes,
"This reacheth not so far as our warranty." The term, it seems, is of great
antiquity, and is said not to have been unknown to the Longobardi in their

original settlements. (Spelm, Gloss. ad voc. and Cowell's Interpreter, ad voc.
and Sullivan's Lectures, 119.)

It

does not fall within the scope of these notes,

to bring the Law down to the present day.-The translator would otherwise
have availed himself largely of Bracton's 5th book. Fleta, L. 5. c. 4. Britton,
197, etc. Co. Litt. 364. b. et
Also see PLUCKNETT 612; RAWLE,
LITT. § 697, at 365a; II BLACKSTONE,
2"Co. LiTr. S 145. Also see note

seq. and Mr. Butler's admirable annotations.
COVENANTS FOR TITLE, ch. I (5th ed. 1887), Co.
COMMENTARIES 302.
of Coke, 101b; author's extended note, COKE ON
LITTLETON 199A (Thomas ed. 1836); PLUCKNETT 612; RAWLE 2.
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instance of a statute giving effect to words in a conveyance," the
statute of 4 Edw. I, Statutum de Bigamis, ch. 6 (A.D. 1276), warranty being created from the use of the words "Dedi and Concessi"
in a deed of feoffment, the relationship of warranty to feudal service
is clearly stated:
In Deeds also where is contained [Dedi & concessi tale tenementum]
without homage, or without a Clause that containeth Warranty, and
to be holden of the Givers, and their Heirs, by a certain Service; It is
agreed that the Givers, and their Heirs shall be bounden to Warranty;
and where is contained [Dedi & concessi, & c.] to be holden to the Chief
Lords of the Fee, or of other [and not of Feoffers, or of their Heirs]
reserving no Service, without Homage, or without the foresaid Clause,
their Heirs shall not be bounden to Warranty; notwithstanding, the
Feoffer during his own Life, by Force of his own Gift, shall be bound
to warrant.
A further effect of the statute de Bigamis was to create warranty
between a tenant in fee who created an entailed estate and his tenant
in tail.
Upon disputation (by a demandant) of the ownership of the vassal or tenant in tail, the latter could thereupon "vouch to warranty"
(i.e., implead or call to warranty) the warrantee who had the duty
to defend the ownership of the vassal. Upon default by the vouchee
or judgment in favor of the demandant against the vassal or tenant
in tail, the latter by means of a writ of warrantia chartae could recover judgment against the vouchee which entitled the disposed vassal to recover from the vouchee lands of equal value.'
Prior to the year 1290 express warranties were little used, as warranties would exist in law from a relationship or be implied from the
words of an instrument used to evidence a feoffment. s However,
in 1290 the statute Quia Emptores was passed prohibiting the practice
of subinfeudation (i.e., the practice of a feoffor alienating in such a
way as to become an immediate lord to the feofee, thereby cutting off
feudal services from the holder of the land to the chief lord) and allowing alienation by a feoffor free of service with substitution of the
feoffee as tenant to the chief lord."
" RAWLE 3. Note the similarity with our present statute, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 1297 (1962). See also CHsTTLY, II BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 300, 301, and notes
as well as author's appendix in Co. LITT. 541-542 (Thomas ed. 1836).
" For fuller discussion of the operation of the writs see Co. LITT. 365a, 1ib, 102a-b;
Co. LITT., author's notes 199A and 243-244 (Thomas ed.); CHITTLY, II BLACKSTONE, COM-

MENTARIES

300, 358-359;

PLUCKNETT 411-412.

"' VII HOLDSWORTH 353. See also note 18 supra.
0 Forasmuch as Purchasers of Lands and Tenements of the Fees of great men
and [other Lords] have many times heretofore entered into their Fees, to the
prejudice of the Lords, [to whom] the Freeholders of such great men have
sold their Lands and Tenements to be holden in Fee of their Feoffers, and not
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The result was that the feoffee owed no duty of service to the
feoffor, the basis for warranty on homage disappeared, and express
warranties came into widespread use.
Strangely, the warranty became a device at common law to attain
results fully as important as securing the title of the feoffee. The

first was a procedural device used to achieve delay in suits for land
where the defendant would vouch to warranty a vouchee who was
either a minor, or was not available to the court, whereupon the
action would be delayed until the vouchee achieved age or became
available to the court. 7 The procedure became very burdensome and
complex and was finally alleviated by statute."
Probably the most important use of the warranty was as a disentailing device. For instance, after the statute de Bigamis, if 0, who
had an eldest son, A, owned an estate tail, he could alien a fee estate
to X but could not bar an action by A to recover. If, however, 0
alienated with warranty, the entail and the burden of warranty would
pass to A, who would be precluded from claiming the estate. The
device was used to bar estates tail as well as remainders and reversions.
of the Chief Lords of the Fees, whereby the same Chief Lords have many times
lost their Escheats, Marriages, and Wardships of Lands and Tenements belonging to their Fees; which thing seemed' very hard and extream unto those
[Lords and other great men] and moreover in this case manifest Disheritance:
Our Lord the King, in his Parliament at Westminster after Easter, the
eighteenth year of his Reign, that is to wit, in the Quinzime of Saint John
Baptist, at the instance of the great Men of the Realm, granted, provided, and
ordained, That from henceforth it shall be lawful to every Freeman to sell
at his own pleasure his Lands and Tenements, or part of them; so that the
Feofee shall hold the same Lands or Tenements of the [Chief Lord of the
same Fee, by such Service] and Customs as his Feoffor held before.
And if he sell any part of such Lands or Tenements to any, the Feoffee
shall immediately hold it of the Chief Lord, and shall forthwith be charged
with the Services, for so much as pertaineth, or ought to pertain to the said
Chief Lord for the same parcel, according to the Quantity of the Land or
Tenement [so] sold: And so in this case the same part of the Service [shall
remain to the Lord, to be taken by the hands of the Feoffee, for the which he
ought] to be attendant and answerable to the same Chief Lord, according to
the Quantity of the Land or Tenement sold, for the parcel of the Service so
due.
Statute of 18 EDw. Ic. I and II (1290) (Quia Emptores).
27 PLUCKNETT 411; also see extended note of author, II Co. LITT. 243-244 (Thomas ed.
1836).
" Westminister, 3 RDw. I, ch. 39, 40 (1275); statute de vocatis ad warrantium, 20
EDW. I (1292); and 14 EDW. III, ch. 18 (1340). It is interesting to note that the last
statute prohibited vouching to warranty a dead man, against which the demandants could
not aver the vouchee was dead! This would seem to be the ultimate delay and well it is
that it does not exist in modern times.
9 PLUCKNETT,

at page

617 states:

It now remains to consider the effect of warranties created by those who
were not tenants in fee simple. The problem first became acute when doweresses and tenants by the curtesy resorted to tortious feoffments coupled with
warranties. When there was issue of the marriage it would normally happen
that the issue would be heir to both patents; hence as heir to his father's
warranty he would be barred from claiming lands to which he was entitled
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So great had become the use of warranty in such a manner that in
1278 the Statute of Gloucester"0 was passed prohibiting warranties
of a tenant by courtesy from barring his heirs; however, the statute
did not extend to warranties of a tenant in tail. Apparently this was
later accomplished by a judicial construction of the statute. 1
This lead to a distinction between warranties of an ancestor passing
to his lineal descendant, the heir to whom the land would pass under
the rule of primogeniture (called lineal warranties), and warranties
binding an heir made by an ancestor from whom the heir could not
inherit the land (called collateral warranties)."
as his mother's heir, and as heir to his mother's warranty (created while she
was doweress) he would be barred from claiming lands which were his paternal
inheritance. Such practices struck at the root of the common law scheme of
family relationships, and in 1278 the legislature intervened.
soThe Statutes of Glouster, 6 EDw. I, ch. 3 (1278):
IT is Established also, That if a Man aliene a Tenement, that he holdeth
by the Law of England, his Son shall not be barred by the Deed of his Father,
from whom no Heritage to him descended, to demand and recover by Writ of
Mortdauncestor, of the Seisin of his Mother, although the Deed of his Father
doth mention, that he and his Heirs be bound to Warranty. And if any Heritage descent to him of his Father's side, then he shall be barred for the Value
of the Heritage that is to him descended. And if in Time after any Heritage
descend to him by the same Father, then shall the Tenant recover against him
of the Seisin of his Mother by a judicial Writ that shall issue out of the Rolls
of the Justices before whom the Plea was pleaded, to resummon his Warranty,
as before hath been done in Cases where the Warrantor cometh into the Court,
saying, That nothing descended from him by whose Deed he is vouched. And
in like manner the Issue of the Son shall recover by Writ of Cosinage, Aiel,
and Besaiel. Likewise in like manner the Heir of the Wife shall not barred
by his Action, after the Death of his Father and Mother, by the Deed of his
Father, if he demand [by action] the Inheritance of his Mother by a Writ of
Entry, which his Father did aliene in the time of his Mother, whereof no Fine
is levied in the King's Court.
a1 Y.B. 33-35 EDW. I (Roll Ser.) 388. This case is so cited by Plucknett; however, the
author was unable to verify the citation. PLUCKNETT 617; II HOLDSWORTH 100; II BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES; 303 Co. LITT. 365b., contain extended discussions of the operation
of lineal and collateral warranties.
3aAs put in Co. LITT. § 697, at 365a, together with Coke's comments:
It is commonly said that there be three Warranties, scil. Warrantie Lineall,
Warrantie Colaterall, and Warrantie that commence by disseisin. And it is to
bee understood, that before the Statute of Glou' all Warranties which descended to them which are heires to those who made the Warranties, were
barres to the same heires to demand any Lands or Tenements against the
Warranties, except the Warranties, which commence by disseisin. For such
warrantie was no barre to the heire, for that the Warrantie comenced by
wrong, viz. by disseisin.
Coke's Comment on § 697:
Here our author beginneth this Chapter with an exact division of warranties.
A warrantie is a covenant reall annexed to lands or tenements, whereby a man
and his heirs are bound to warrant the same; and either upon voucher, or by
judgment in a writ of warrantia cartae, to yield other lands and tenements
(which in old bookes is called in excambio) to the value of those that shall
bee evicted by a former title, or else may bee used by way of rebutter.
And also commented on by Blackstone:
Lineal warranty was, where the heir derived, or might by possibility has derived, his title to the land warranted, either from or through the ancestor
who made the warranty; as where a father, or an elder son in the life of the
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Since only lineal warranties were prevented by statute or judicial
construction from barring an heir of an entailed estate, a great deal
of ingenuity was used to reach the same result through the medium
of collateral warranty, which, to be successful, needed the cooperation of other family members. As a result much complicated law
(now obsolete) was developed concerning the distinction between
and operation of lineal and collateral warranties."
Following the passage of the Statute of Uses,' the common law
modes of assurance fell into disuse, as the foundation was thereby
laid for modern conveyances by the raising and execution of a use,
without the necessity for livery of seisin.
Through a series of statutes in England the common law doctrine
of warranty was progressively limited until, in 1833 by the act of
3 & 4 Will. IV chs. 37 and 74, lineal and collateral warranties were
abolished along with the remnants of common law real actions.
C. The Covenant Of Warranty
1. England
In England covenants of title developed following the passage of
the Statute of Uses. It has been well argued that common law warranty, a covenant real, being no longer appropriate to the modern
form of conveyancing (since it passed only to the eldest son due
to its basis in primogeniture) fell into disuse, and was replaced by
broader personal covenants of the grantor to which he would respond
in damages."5 A distinction was recognized by early writers between
the common law warranty and covenants for title. Lord Coke stated:
father, released to the disseisor of either themselves or the grandfather, with
warranty, this was lineal to the younger son. Collateral warranty was where
the heirs title to the land neither was, nor could have been derived from the
warranting ancestor, as where a younger brother released to his father's disseisor, with warranty, this was collateral to the elder brother.
3
3Co. LITT. § 697, 364b; § 706, 371a; § 707, 371b; § 713; Co. LITT. 221 n.
(Thomas ed.); II BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 301, 302, 303; PLUCKNETT, 617.
3427 HEN. VIII, ch. 10 (1536).
s VII HOLDSWORTH 257, wherein the author states:
Not much is heard of the warranty implied on a feoffment for life after
the middle of the seventeenth century. The reasons are fairly obvious. In the
first place, the procedure by which it was enforced was becoming obsolete. We
have seen that it could be enforced only by voucher or by writ of warrantia
cartae. It could be used as a defence in the new action of trespass. Therefore
it was not at first available as a defence in the new action of ejectment; but
the inconvenience of this rule, and the desire of the courts to favour this new
action, induced them to allow a defendant to get the benefit of the warranty
by giving it in evidence. In spite, however, of this relaxation, it was a remedy
which was bound up with the real actions. It therefore fell out of use with
them, and for the same reasons as they fell out of use.
Holdsworth further cites Booth, writing in 1701, "'This action is brought rarely, though
sometimes at this day it may be, for I remember one about 20, or 22 years ago, before the
justice of Chester .... " (VII HOLDSWORTH 257 n.3). See also RAWLE 11.
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"But note, there is a diversitie betweene a warrantie that is a covenant
reall, which bindeth the partie to yield Lands or Tenements in recompense, and a Covenant annexed to the Land, which is to yield but
damages, for that a Covenant is in many cases extended further than
the warrantie. '
The covenants for title eventually superseded the common law
warranty, and, as developed in England, the grantor would covenant:
(1) that he was seized in fee (covenant of seisin),
(2) that he had the power to convey (covenant of right to convey)
(3) for continuous quiet enjoyment of the purchaser and his heirs
and assigns (covenant of quiet enjoyment),
(4) that the lands were free from encumbrances (covenant
against encumbrances), and
(5) for further assurances if necessary to vest title in the grantee
(covenant of further assurance).
2. United States
Apparently what is known in this country as the "covenant of
warranty" had no counterpart in England," and, indeed, a search of
contemporary English law uncovers no mention of such a covenant
as it related to land."s What then is the source of the covenant of
warranty in the United States and Texas, if such did not exist in
England?
The first settlers in the United States in any numbers began arriving around the year 1640, and by 1690 there were some 250,000
colonists in what is now eastern United States. At this time in England real actions had not been abolished and the common law action
of warranty was still used, though obsolete. It is the view of one
writer"8 that colonists learned in the common law transmutated the
common law warranty into a covenant, by using the feudal form of
warranty and adding words of covenant."'
A search of early Texas cases for the history of the covenant of
warranty is unproductive." However, in the later Texas case of
6

"7

Co. LITT. 384b. Also see author's note, II Co. LITT. 260-265 (Thomas ed.).

1 RAWLE, COVENANTS FOR TITLE ch. VIII (5th ed.) (herein referred to as RAWLE).
"SAn examination of MEws, DIGEST OF ENGLISH CASE LAW (2d ed. 1925); THE ENGLISH AND EMPIRE

DIGEST

(1962);

and HALSBURY,

LAWS OF ENGLAND

(3d

ed. 1956),

shows no listing under warranty or covenant of warranty to land.
3

9RAWLE 351-358.

40 RAWLE, ch. VIII, § 116. See also ch. I, § 14 n.3, where the author comments upon
the amalgamation of common law into the jurisprudence of the colonies.
4 Of some thirty-five cases decided up to the year 1886 no discussion was found as to
the basis for the covenant of warranty, although some discussion was found as to the
measure of damages to be applied. In the latter case the courts did draw analogies to English
law, but, generally, did not identify which covenant for title the English courts were considering.
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Wiggins v. Stephens," the court stated:
Under ancient English law the warranty was, in substance, a covenant whereby the grantor of a freehold estate and his heirs were bound
to warrant the title, and the tenant might bring a writ of warrantia
chartae against the warrantor to compel him to assist with a good plea
or defense or else to render damages to the amount of the value of the
land, if recovered against the tenant Wendell's Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 3, p. 300. In that proceeding the ancient uniform rule was
that the plaintiff recovered only the value of the land as it was when
the warranty was made. The reimbursement, at that time, consisted of
lands of the warrantor, or which his heir or heirs inherited from him,
of value equal to that from which the feofee was evicted. When ordinary purchase and sale of land began to become common, the idea of
fluctuation in value was not in mind, and the consideration was regarded
as the pecuniary equivalent of the old agreement of enfeoff of lands of
equal value. Instead of getting land of equal value, the plaintiff was to
get what both parties had by consent substituted for it-the consideration. Personal covenants supplanted the ancient warranty because they
resulted in an easier, more certain, and more effectual recovery. But the
change did not affect the established measure of damages, except to
substitute for land of value equal to that from which the defendant was
evicted the consideration paid for it, with interest, as the thing to be
recovered.
The language quoted above bears a striking resemblance to the
theory of Rawle' 3 concerning the transmutation of the common law
warranty. However, it further appears that the paraphrase of Blackstone is not accurate and that the correct quote is that the "lord was
bound to give him another feud of equal value in recompense." No
mention is made of damages. Normally an action based on common
law warranty would not support a recovery for damages. It is true
that the courts did make an exception in the situation where recovery on the warranty as a covenant real was impossible, to prevent a
failure of justice, by "moulding it into a covenant personal." 5 Since
this apparently was rarely done it would seem to furnish little basis
upon which to connect the modern day covenant with the feudal
warranty.
However, the Texas Courts were not alone, for the early colonial
courts, nearer to the common law traditions than were the Texas
42

246 S.W. 84, 85 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922).

43 Note 39 supra.
" See complete text, note 17 supra, and also see extended note in 1 SMITH'S LEADING
CASES 215 (8th ed. 1852); RAWLE, § 113. According to the note in RAWLE only two re-

ported cases were found allowing recovery of damages, one in the year 1600, the other in
the year 1845.
45RAWLE 144, 145 n.1 (collecting early cases showing such confusion).
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courts, often confused the nature and effect of common law warranty with covenants of title."
Unlike the cases dealing with after-acquired title, where the early
Texas courts searched for a basis for the rule, in cases dealing with
the covenant of warranty for title the Texas courts accepted and
adopted the early colonial decisions without question. It may properly be said that the covenant of warranty in Texas has no direct
antecedent in the common law warranty.
D. The Common Law Warranty As A Basis For Passing AfterAcquired Title
Rawle, an early author of an outstanding work on covenants for
title, writing during the last half of the nineteenth century, when
some learning in depth still existed as to the English common law,
was vehement in his position that the feudal warranty could not pass
after-acquired title, that notwithstanding the manner and extent, if
any, to which the covenant of warranty could be analogized to the
feudal warranty, in no way could the covenant historically support
after-acquired title, the only remedy being one in damages." The
conclusion does not seem to be entirely correct.
It has been stated that a feudal warranty could not exist without
an estate to support it. In Coke's note to section 742 of Coke on
Littleton, he states: "Here Littleton putteth another case upon the
same ground and reason, viz, where the state whereunto the warranty is annexed is defeated, there the warranty itself is defeated
also, which is one of the maxims of the common law."
The estate necessary to support the warranty could be created in
three ways: (1) by feoffment," which necessitated the livery of
"This

is well stated by Rawle:
These cases have at times been considered as deciding broadly that a personal
action of covenant would at any time have lain upon a warranty, and on the
other hand it has more than once been seriously urged, as it was in Williamson
v. Codrington, that upon a covenant of warranty in its present form nothing
but a writ of warrantia chartae can be brought. In truth, save that the old
warranty and the preesnt covenants were alike intended as a means of redress
against loss of the estate, nothing could be more unlike than the two. The
former was a part of the system of feudal tenure, and the remedy upon it
by writ of warrantia chartae or voucher, though peculiar, was appropriate.
The latter was a part of what some have called the modern system of law,
and the remedy upon it by the personal action of covenant equally appropriate.
Warranty orignally partook of the simplicity of the common law, and its effect
by way of rebutter of the heir was simple and just, till the ingenuity of the
times seized upon it for a particular purpose and fashioned it to meet an endthat of barring estates tail-for which it had never, of course, been intended,
and hence arose complications which to one imperfectly learned in the history
of the subject would seem to present great difficulties.
RAWLE 144-45.
" RAWLE chs. VIII and IX.
48 Co. LITT. 367a.
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seisin; (2) by a judicial proceeding known as a fine;49 and, (3) by
common recoveries, a fictitious judicial action mainly used to unfetter
entailed estates." As mentioned above, fines and recoveries were abolished in 1833 in England by statute. 1
Since livery of seisin was deemed to be an actual transfer of the
land itself, a person seized of the land could, though wrongfully, pass
a fee simple estate by way of livery. The fine and common recovery
had a similar effect, and feoffee again being vested with a fee estate
capable of supporting a warranty. This may be contrasted with the
operation of a modern deed through which a grantee acquires no
title to Blackacre if, in fact, his grantor had none to convey. At common law the feoffee had an estate in land until evicted. The feofment, fine or common recovery, therefore, did not pass an afteracquired title in any sense, but passed a present (although sometimes
defeasable) estate."
Other modes of conveyance in use prior to the passage of the
Statute of Uses included the grant, which applied only to incorporeal
interests" and may be dismissed from consideration, and the lease and
release which transferred title without livery of seisin," but apparently only operated on the estate presently owned by the releasor
" Co. LITT. 48a, b. Blackstone described a fine as follows:
A fine is sometimes said to be a feoffment of record: though it might with
more accuracy be called an acknowledgment of a feoffment on record. By
which is to be understood, that it has at least the same force and effect with a
feoffment, in the conveyancy and assuring of lands; though it is one of those
methods of transferring estates of freehold by the common law, in which
livery of seisen is not necessary to be actually given; the supposition and
acknowledgment thereof in a court of record, however, fictitious, inducing
inequal notoriety.
II BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 348.
50 See op. cit. supra note 49, at 357.
1

"52 FINE AND RECOVERIES AcT,

3 & 4 WILL. IV chs. 37 and 74 (1833).

Co. LITT. 49a, 367a, 387a, 599, 611; RAWLE, § 254, at 389.
543 II BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 317.
1d. at 318, 325.
s5 Rawle strongly argued that a release could only operate on an existing estate and
that a warranty contained in a release, when the releasor owned no estate in land, would
not bind his heirs, it is not entirely clear that this was so. It appears to be the clear import
of Co. LITT. § 446, set forth in text accompanying note 14 supra, that a release with warranty by one without an interest may bar the releasor.
Rawle spends some time explaining the existence of a present estate to support Coke's
comment in Co. LITT. § 446, i.e., that a release with warranty will bar the son. RAWLE
388-93. However, in an analogous fact situation, Coke finds no estate to support a release
without warranty:
But here in the case which Littleton puts where the Sonne release in the life
of his father, this release is void (a) because hee hath no right at all at the
time of the release made, but all the right was at that time in the Father, but
after the decease of the Father, the son shall enter into the land, against his
owne release.
Although it may be argued that Rawle was wrong and that a warranty contained in a
release where the heir has no present title would bar the heir, in Texas, at least, the release could be upheld as a conveyance of an expectancy. Hale v. Hollon, 90 Tex. 427,
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Since the feudal warranty only bound heirs determined under the
rule of primogeniture, no situation at common law would be comparable to that existing today where the title acquired by a grantor
following his execution of a deed is not inherited or devised. It would
seem that it may be concluded that the feudal warranty did not operate to pass after-acquired title, as we understand the doctrine today.

E. Covenants of Title As A Basis For Passing After-Acquired Title
Although the covenant of warranty has been the covenant most
frequently mentioned (among the covenant cases) as a basis for passage of after-acquired title in Texas, some early cases also reached
this result where the breach was of the covenant of seisen,' covenant
of quiet enjoyment,57 or the covenant of further assurance."

1. The Covenant of Seisin
There is some question as to the extent to which the covenant of
seisin is applicable in Texas today."8 It should be more properly
thought of as a covenant that the grantor is indefeasibly vested with
the land described. The common law concept of seisin has never
been recognized as part of our jurisprudence. This covenant is
breached upon conveyance and it appears in Texas that the cause of
action does not pass to and cannot be enforced by a remote grantee. 60
Although this result can be criticized on the ground that upon breach
a chose in action is created which may be considered as assigned by
later conveyances to subsequent grantees who suffer harm, it is also
clear that historically the remedy for breach of the covenant of seisin
or good right to convey was solely in damages"' and generally has not
been relied upon as a basis for passing the after-acquired title of the
grantor.
2. The Covenant of Further Assurance
The covenant of further assurance, on the other hand, is somewhat
similar to the doctrine of after-acquired title in that the grantor
binds himself to execute such further instruments as may be neces39 S.W. 287 (1897) and Clark v, Gauntt, 138 Tex. 558, 161 S.W.2d 270 (1942)), which
is not strictly analogous to the passing of an after-acquired title.
" Gould v. West, 32 Tex. 339 (1869); Dupree v. Frank, 39 S.W. 988 (Tex. Civ. App.
1897); Randolph v. Junker, 21 S.W. 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1892).
5
Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Fox, 228 S.W. 1021 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
" Gould v. West, 32 Tex. 339 (1869).
" Childress v. Siler, 272 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.; Fender v.
Farr, 262 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Shannon v. Childers, 202 S.W. 1030 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1918) error ref. Note also the indecision as to whether the covenant, if it exists,
runs with the land.

" See cases cited note 59 supra.

"' Childress v. Siler, 272 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.
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sary to perfect title in the grantee, which would include the duty to
convey any later-acquired title to land described in a deed containing
such covenant. This covenant is treated as running with the land
and passes to remote grantees. However, the vesting of the afteracquired title does not pass by virtue of the original deed but only
upon enforcement by an action of specific performance of the contractual right contained therein.
Although the passing of after-acquired title might logically have
developed from an extension of the covenant of further assurance,
it has never been so held." This is probably due to the fact that this
covenant is not customarily included in conveyancess in Texas and
is not implied by law.
3. The Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
The covenant of quiet enjoyment has not been mentioned by
the courts as a basis for passing after-acquired title and in Texas is
probably treated as being included in the covenant of general warranty.
4. The Covenant of Warranty
The extent to which the courts have used the covenant of warranty
as a vehicle to support the passage of after-acquired title to prevent
a circuity of action on the covenant, would presuppose the existence
of a valid covenant and an enforceable cause of action thereon.
An enforceable contractual right normally requires the support of
consideration, and it has been held in Texas that where the deed is
without consideration an action on the covenant of warranty fails."4
However, at least one Texas case has held that natural love and affec2 In Gould v. West, 32 Tex. 339 (1869), the court merely mentions the covenant of
further assurance as one of several rationales.
'SAlthough not used generally in conveyances it is often found in assignments of oil
and gas leases as is an express statement of ownership (seisin) and good right to convey:
Assignors, and each of them warrant (1) that they are the lawful owners of
the above described oil, gas and mineral leases, and each of them, and all
rights, titles, interests and estates thereunder, (2) that the net leasehold estate
herein conveyed (after deduction of outstanding overriding royalty and all
other outstanding interests) is not less than three-fourths (3/4ths) of eighteighths (8/8) of all of the oil, gas and other minerals, in, to, under and that
may be produced from the lands described in said oil, gas and mineral leases,
(3) that all rentals and royalties payable under each of said leases have been
paid, (4) that each of said leases is in full force and effect and is a valid and
subsisting oil, gas and mineral lease against the hereinabove described land,
(5) that Assignors, and each of them, have good right and authority to sell
and convey the same, and (6) that said leases and mineral leasehold estates
and each of them, except as herein described, are free from any overriding
royalties or production payments, liens, encumbrances or claims of any type
or character.
Few Texas cases appear on this point. See Davis v. Agnew, 67 Tex. 206, 2 S.W. 376
(1886); and Whatley v. Patten, 31 S.W. 60 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
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tion are sufficient to support the covenant of warranty when the

remedy sought is one of after-acquired title rather than damages."'
It also appears that the warranty cases will support after-acquired
title where there is no present danger of an eviction and where no
personal action on the covenant would lie."6
If the grantee and his assignees have an enforceable right to an
after-acquired title in factual situations where they could not enforce
the covenant of warranty in a suit for damages, the court clearly is
not passing after-acquired title to prevent a circuity of action on the
covenant. Not only have the courts substantially distorted the covenant of warranty in after-acquired title cases as to the necessity for
an enforceable contract right and eviction of the covenantee, the
remedy is distorted
as well, the courts considering that title passes
"eo instante" 7 to the grantee and his successors upon acquisition by
the grantor. This is rather a strange result for the holder of an enforceable contract right, i.e., an automatic extra-judicial specific
performance.
It is the author's conclusion that the doctrine of after-acquired title
in Texas does not find a proper theoretical basis in the rationale of
prevention of multiple actions based on the convenants of warranty,
or other covenants of title.

F. Estoppel As A Basis For Passing After-Acquired Title
1. Early Texas Cases
Although it may be concluded that no historical precedent to support after-acquired title arises from the common law warranty, this
is not true as to the doctrine of estoppel by deed. " In the United
65

Robinson v. Douthit, 64 Tex. 101 (1885).
" Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289, 294 S.W.2d 781 (1956); Childress v. Siler, 272
S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.; Morris v. Short, 151 S.W. 633 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1912). But see Freteliere v. Hendes, 57 Tex. 392 (1882), where a release of
warranty destroyed grantee's right to an after-acquired title.
7
" Caswell v. Llano Oil Co., 120 Tex. 139, 36 S.W.2d 208 (1931); Baldwin v. Root,
90 Tex. 546, 40 S.W. 3 (1897); Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Fox, 228 S.W. 1021
(Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Newton v. Easterwood, 154 S.W. 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913)
error ref.; Lowry v. Carter, 102 S.W. 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) error ref. At least one
early case indicated that an equitable title passes to the grantee upon the grantor's acquired
title, although a warranty rationale was relied upon to support the after-acquiring title,
Ackerman v. Smiley, 37 Tex. 211 (1872).
68 For instance Lord Coke states:
Estoppe commeth of the French word Estoupe, from whence the English
word Stopped: and it is called an Estoppel or Conclusion, because a mans owne
Act or acceptance stoppeth or closeth by his mouth to alleage or plead the
truth: And Littletons case here proveth this description.
Touching Estoppels, which is an excellent and curious kinde of learning,
it is to be observed, that there be three kinde of Estoppels, viz. By matter of
Record, by matter in writing, and by matter in Paiis. . ..
(b) By matter in Writing, as by Deed indented, by making of an Acquit-
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States the courts early adopted the estoppel by deed doctrine to preclude the parties to a deed and their privies from denying the recitals
contained therein. The estoppel to deny recitals was then expanded to
pass title by estoppel, i.e., after-acquired title:
An estate by estoppel arises, generally speaking, in cases where a
grantor without title makes a lease or conveyance of land by deed with
warranty, and subsequently by descent or by purchase acquires the
ownership. This after-acquired title of the grantor "inures," it is usual
to say, by estoppel to the benefit of the grantee. It would perhaps more
accurately state the situation, under our modern deeds of conveyance,
to say that the deed, which the grantor engages to warrant and defend,
is a solemn stipulation that the grantor has the title which he is now
about to transfer to the grantee as a purchaser for value. In the face
of this he cannot be heard to say, after making the transfer, that he had
not title at the time. So his new title lies lifeless in his hands against such
purchaser; the estoppel not being a true conveyance.6 9

In probably the leading early case in the United States, Van Renselaer v. Kearney," the United States Supreme Court speaking through
Mr. Justice Nelson, firmly bottomed the doctrine of after-acquired
title on an estoppel of the grantor."'
After some vacilliation by the Texas courts, it appeared that in
1892 this view would be firmly embedded in Texas law by the case of
Lindsay v. Freeman," wherein the Texas Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Tarlton, adopted the viewpoint of Van Rennsselaer
and said:
tance by Deed indented, or Deed poll, (c) by Defeasance, by Deed indented,
or Deed poll.
Co. LITT. 352a.
The doctrine is recognized in England as part of the present body of law.
69
BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL 384 (5th ed. 1876). In the case of a deed executed by multiple
grantors, unless expressly limited, it would appear any after-acquired title of a grantor will
pass to the grantee, although in excess of the interest he subjectively intended to convey.
See Germany v. Turner, 132 Tex. 491, 123 S.W.2d 874 (1939). This would seem especially
true if the covenant rationale is applied. See Keith Lumber Co. v. Houston Oil Co., 257
Fed. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 666 (1919).
7052 U.S. (11 How.) 325 (1850).
71
The principle deducible from these authorities seems to be, that, whatever
may be the form or nature of the conveyance used to pass real property, if the
grantor sets forth on the face of the instrument, by way of recital or averment, that he is seized or possessed of a particular estate in the premises, and
which estate the deed purports to convey; or, what is the same thing, if the
seizin or possession of a particular estate is affirmed in the deed, either in
express terms or by necessary implication, the grantor and all persons in privity
with him shall be estopped from ever afterwards denying that he was so seized
and possessed at the time he made the conveyance. The estoppel works upon
the estate, and binds an after-acquired title as between parties and privies.
The reason is, that the estate thus affirmed to be in the party at the time
of the conveyance must necessarily have influenced the grantee in making the
purchase, and hence the grantor and those in privity with him, in good faith
and fair dealing, should be forever thereafter precluded from gainsaying it.
52 U.S. (11 How.) 325 (1850).
7' 83 Tex. 259, 18 S.W. 727 (1892).
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If the grantors, the Lowery sisters, did not possess the estate which
the deed purports to convey, nevertheless, as it was their clear intention,
shown by the deed, to convey a fee simple, they and their privies,
whether in blood, in estate, or in law, are estopped to claim by an afteracquired title, though the deed contains no warranty. The language in
the deed whereby the grantors "convey" the fee simple estate in the land
constitutes a recital which imports an assertion by them that they are
the owners in fee simple of the land; and having thus asserted the fact
of their ownership, the grantors are estopped to deny such fact.73
In answering the argument of the appellant's attorney the court

further stated:
Appellant, combatting the contention of the appellees, sustained in
the views here expressed, uses the following quotation from Devl. Deeds,
§ 945: "In the absence of statutory enactment the general rule is, that
the deed must contain a covenant of some kind to cause an afteracquired title to pass by estoppel. In some of the early New York cases
it was held that an after-acquired title passed without any covenant;
but these cases were subsequently overruled, and the doctrine announced
that a subsequently acquired title would not, in the absence of some
covenant or stipulation, pass to the grantee." To meet the rule stated,
the learned author does not in our opinion mean to indicate that the deed
must contain an express covenant. If the words of an instrument import an assertion or stipulation of title by the grantor, which he conveys,
they imply a covenant which will work the estoppel. That this is the
author's meaning appears from the cases cited in support of the text,
in nearly all of which the instruments adjudged to be insufficient to
preclude the grantor from asserting an after-acquired title are held to
be mere quitclaim deeds, or are such as neither express nor imply a
covenant.74

The court clearly indicates that the presence of an express or implied warranty does not raise an action on the covenant as the basis
for after-acquired title, but goes to the nature of the manifested
intent of the grantor as to whether or not he purports to convey the
land described, or an interest therein, to the grantee. If the grantor
does not own the land purported to be conveyed, which he later
acquires, he is then estopped to deny that under the deed the grantee
now owns the land. Although at common law estoppel by deed only
applied to conveyances under seal, this requirement has now become
obsolete, at least in Texas.75
Id.

at 264, 18 S.W. 727 (citations omitted).
Id. at 265, 18 S.W. 727.
' From time to time a question has arisen whether statutory provisions placed unsealed
instruments on the same basis as common law instruments under seal. See TEX. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. arts. 27, 7093 (1925)
(Act of 1911, now repealed). Also see the recent case
of Unthank v. Rippstein, 386 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. 1964).
73
74
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2. Form of Deed or Other Conveyance
It is commonly stated that a quitclaim deed will not pass an afteracquired title; however, the statement may be generalized to one
that the deed must purport to convey a specific interest in the described land."8 The question of whether a deed purports to convey a
chance of title or an interest in the land is important not only in the
after-acquired title cases, but also in cases dealing wtih the question
of the qualification of a grantee as a bona fide purchaser of a later
legal title (to cut off prior equities) or as a subsequent purchaser
without notice under the recording statutes." A deed that will not
so qualify is normally defined as a quitclaim deed.
A conveyance of all one's "right, title and interest" in and to described property is no more than a quitclaim deed, unless an intent
can otherwise be found that title is conveyed."' This is so although
7Halbert v. Green, 156 Tex. 223, 293 S.W.2d 848 (1956); Clark v. Gauntt, 138 Tex.
559, 161 S.W.2d 270 (1942); Threadgill v. Bickerstaff, 87 Tex. 520, 29 S.W. 757 (1895);
Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255 (1875); Manwaring v. Terry, 39 Tex. 67 (1873); Renfrow
v. Lineberry, 271 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.;
Green v. West Texas
Coal Mining & Dev. Co., 225 S.W. 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) error ref.; Hopkins v.
Walters, 224 S.W. 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Breen v. Morehead, 126 S.W. 650 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1910), aff'd, 104 Tex. 254, 136 S.W. 1047 (1911); Culmell v. Barroum, 35
S.W. 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896) error ref., 90 Tex. 93, 37 S.W. 313 (1896); Bedford v.
Rayner Cattle Co., 35 S.W. 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).
"Richardson v. Levi, 67 Tex. 359, 3 S.W. 444 (1887); Houston Oil Co. v. Niles,
255 S.W. 604 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923). Also see 2 LANGE, LAND TITLES § 484 (1961).
78 For instance see Clark v. Gauntt, 138 Tex. 559, 161 S.W.2d 270 (1942); Threadgill
v. Bickerstaff, 87 Tex. 520, 29 S.W. 757 (1895); Harrison v. Barroum, 44 Tex. 255
(1875). It has been thought that the classification of an instrument as a quitclaim deed
was the same in case of qualification of a subsequent purchaser, etc. as to pass on afteracquired title. But see Bryan v. Thomas, 365 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1963), where a purchaser
of "all of our undivided interest" in and to all of the oil, gas, and other minerals in and
under a descripted tract of land was deemed a bone-fide purchaser for value without
notice. The case is similar to Green v. West Texas Coal Mining & Dev. Co., 225 S.W. 548
(Tex. Civ. App. 1920) error ref. Both cases seem clearly erroneous on the question of not
classifying the conveyance as a quitclaim deed.
A good discussion of whether a deed is a quitclaim deed or purports to convey title is
found in Cook v. Smith, 107 Tex. 119, 122-23, 174 S.W. 1094 (1915):
The character of an instrument, as constituting a deed to land or merely a
quit claim deed, is to be determined according to whether it assumes to convey
the property described and upon its face has that effect, or merely professes
to convey the grantor's title to the property. If, according to the face of the
instrument, its operation is to convey the property itself, it is a deed. If, on
the other hand, it purports to convey no more than the title of the grantor,
it is only a quit claim deed. Richardson v. Levi, 67 Tex. 364, 3 S.W. 444;
Threadgill v. Bickerstaff, 87 Tex. 520, 29 S.W. 757. The intention of the
instrument is to be confined, of course, to that which its terms reveal; but
it should be considered in its entirety, and if, taken as a whole, it discloses a
purpose to convey the property itself, as distinguished from the mere title of
the grantor, such as it may be, it should be given the effect of a deed, although
some of its characteristics may be those of a quit claim deed. The use of the
term "quit claim" is not, of itself, a conclusive test of its character. It may
make use of that term and yet have the effect of a conveyance of the property.
Garrett v. Christopher, 74 Tex. 453, 12 S.W. 67, 15 Am. St. Rep. 850;
Richardson v. Levi, supra.
The granting clause of the deed from Potts to Neff, "have bargained, sold,
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the deed contains a covenant of warranty, as it has been long
that a clause of warranty will not enlarge the grant."9 Normally
intent must appear on the face of the instrument, however, at
one case has indicated that intent may be found from extrinsic

held
such
least
fac-

tors such as whether the grantee paid full market value. Some early
courts erroneously found such intent in the presence of the habendum s° clause; however, this view was later rejected. 8
More difficult constructional questions have arisen concerning the
effect of recitals contained in a deed otherwise purporting to convey
the land."
released and forever quit claimed, and by these presents do hereby bargain,
sell, release and forever quit claim, unto the said A. A. Neff . . . all my right,
title and interest in and to that certain tracts or parcels of land," and the
habendum clause, as well, "to have and to hold the said premises, together
with all and singular the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereto in any
manner belonging to the said A. A. Neff and his heirs and assigns forever, so
that neither I, the said R. Potts, nor my heirs nor any person or persons
claiming under me, shall at any time hereafter have, claim or demand any
right or title to the aforesaid premises or appurtenances or any part thereof,"
are essentially in the terms of a quit claim deed. If the character of the
instrument were dependent alone upon the construction of these parts of it,
there could be no doubt, under the authority of Threadgill v. Biokerstaff,
supra, and Hunter v. Eastham, 95 Tex. 648, 69 S.W. 66, of its being simply a
quit claim deed, since these clauses are in substantially the same terms as the
granting and habendum clauses of the respective instruments reviewed in those
decisions and there held to be quit claim deeds.
But the presence in the deed from Potts to Neff of the clause, "and it is
my intention here now to convey to the said A. A. Neff all the real estate that
I own in said town of Paducah, whether it is set out above or not," cannot
be overlooked. It discloses very plainly, we think, that the grantor's intention
in the execution of the instrument was to convey all of the property situated
in the town previously described, and any other property there owned by him
which was not described.
" See Wilson v. Wilson, 118 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
8 Bell v. Gaines, 237 S.W. 346 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Bedford v. Rayner Cattle Co.,
35 S.W. 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896); Garrett v. Christopher, 74 Tex. 453, 12 S.W. 67
(1889).
s Culmell v. Borroum, 35 S.W. 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896) error ref., 90 Tex. 93, 37
S.W. 313 (1896).
s The question appears also as to construction of deeds passing present title.
It should be noted that if two clauses in a deed are ambiguous, as to the estate granted,
they will be construed in favor of the grantee and pass the greatest estate either will permit,
and the other will be rejected, Cartwright v. Trueblood, 90 Tex. 535, 39 S.W. 930 (1897);
Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Staley Oil Co., 138 Tex. 198, 158 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Comm. App.
1942), affirming 138 S.W.2d 838 (1940).
(a) In Rettig v. Houston West End Realty Co., 254 S.W. 765 (Tex. Comm. App.
1923), affirming 241 S.W. 614, grantor inherited the interest of his mother and brother in
a tract of land and executed a deed containing the following recitations:
Know all men by these presents, that I, Taylor Harris, only child and sole
heir of Martha Harris, deceased, * * * have granted, sold and conveyed, and
by these presents do grant, sell and convey under the said John T. Tullock all
of my right, title and interest, being an undivided one-half interest inherited
as sole heir of Martha Harris, in and to the following described land and
premises, to-wit: 25 acres of land [describing the John Harris tract by
metes and bounds]. (Emphasis added.)
254 S.W.2d at 768.
The court stated:
The statement that it was the "one-half interest inherited as sole heir of
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Consider for example the effect of the following recital which
might be contained in a deed as part of the description of the land
conveyed: "to the place of beginning, the land herein conveyed being
all of the interest of the grantors, in and to said above described
tract of land and which was inherited by them from their mother,
and also from their father."
At the time of conveyance an undivided interest in the property
is owned by grantor's brother, which thereafter passes to grantors
by descent and distribution upon his death.
The Texas cases state a simple test (application being a different
story) from which to determine if after-acquired title will pass: Does
the deed, looking at it as a whole, convey the land, or merely indicate
an intention to convey only the presently owned interest, or property acquired from a specific source. Clauses construed as indicating
only the source of title have been interpreted as not restricting the
granting clause, and the deed will operate to estop the grantor from
claiming later-acquired interests or interests obtaining from a differMartha Harris" merely indicates the source of title, and is not a limitation or
restriction on the interest conveyed, as the deed passed not only this particular
interest, but all right, title and interest. . . . If it be conceded that there is
ambiguity in the deed, and this is susceptible of two constructions, that one
will be adopted which is most favorable to the grantee.
Ibid.
It was held that the deed passed all interest of the grantor up to a one-half undivided
interest and included the interest inherited prior to the deed, from the grantor's brother.
(b) In Germany v. Turner, 132 Tex. 491, 123 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Comm. App. 1939),
the surviving wife and purported sole heirs of decedent granted, sold, and conveyed all of
a certain tract of land described by metes and bounds, by general warranty deed. It was
subsequently discovered that the deed bore forged signatures of some of the heirs. In a suit
in trespess to try title it was held that where there was no limitation or exception on the
general warranty that the co-grantors were joint and severally liable on the warranty to the
extent of the whole interest conveyed. The court further held that the recitation that
grantors were the surviving wife and heirs of the former owner was a mere indication of the
source of title and not a limitation upon the granting clause and rejected the contention
of surviving wife that she was only conveying her individual interest in the tract described.
The court stated:
If in this instance the recitals in the premises be given the effect of limiting
the estate conveyed to only the individual undivided interest of the grantors,
then the premises are unquestionably in direct conflict with the granting,
habendum and warranty clauses. This conflict can be avoided or resolved by
giving to the recitals a construction that they are merely descriptio personae,
. . . or were intended to refer to the source or history of title, and were not
intended to create a limitation upon the quantity of the estate conveyed.
123 S.W.2d at 877.
(c) In Spangler v. Spangler, 42 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), a child inherited
a 1/24 interest in certain lands upon his father's death, but prior to the death of his
mother conveyed an undivided 1/12 interest by a deed containing the following clause: "It
being my intention to convey all my interest in and to said tracts of land by reason of
being a child and legal heir of my father."
Subsequent to this deed grantor's mother died and he inherited an additional 1/24 interest. It was held that the above clause limited the grant to the interest inherited from
the father, i.e., a 1/24 interest, and that the interest subsequently acquired from the mother
did not pass to the grantee.
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ent source." However, a clause manifesting an interest to pass title to

property from a particular source or interest will have the effect of
limiting the grant and estoppel will not arise. s4 As indicated in the
above example, most confusing are deeds containing reference to land
acquired by descent or devise. Although little can be done as to existing conveyances (except litigation), this is a drafting problem that

should not be ignored and the draftsman should use care as to the
form of recitals included.
Not only do references to source cause plentiful headaches as to
intent, the same problems can result from the effort of a draftsman
to shore up a deed description by including indiscriminate references
to prior recorded deeds. Consider the following chain of title: 0 to A
purporting to convey Blackacre; A to B purporting to convey an
undivided one-half interest in Blackacre; and, B to C purporting to
convey Blackacre. X as attorney for D (proposed purchaser from C)
draws a deed based upon a new survey and, in an attempt to remove
possible ambiguities caused by variations in prior descriptions, in-

cludes the recital "being the same land conveyed by A to B etc." If
C later acquires A's remaining one-half interest it will not pass to D,
as the granting clause has been modified by the reference back to B's
deed. 8 The reference is to the interest conveyed to B which was only
8" Retig v. Houston West End Realty Co. and Germany v. Turner, note 82 supra. Also
see Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 135 Tex. 508, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940); Cartwright
v. Trueblood, 90 Tex. 535, 39 S.W. 930 (1879); West v. Herman, 104 S.W. 428 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1907). A recent case in which it can be argued the recitation should have been
given effect is Burns v. Goodrich, 392 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 1965).
" Spangler v. Spangler, 42 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Wilson v. Wilson, 118
S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
sThis type of situation has caused headaches more than once in the oil and gas area,
as well as in other areas of the law. For instance:
(a) In King v. First National Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260
(1946), a reference in a reservation clause in a deed to the land "hereinabove
described" was held to refer to the entire fee rather than the undivided interest
conveyed.
(b) A contrary result was reached in Hooks v. Neill, 21 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App.
1929) error ref., where reference back was to premises "herein described and conveyed."
(c) In Harris v. Windsor, 156 Tex. 324, 294 S.W.2d 798 (1956), a reference following
a metes and bounds description: "and being the same land described in warranty
deed . . . to which reference is made for all purposes" where former deed conveyed
a lesser undivided interest held to limit the granting clause to the interest conveyed
by the former deed. Note that if the reference back had not been for "all purposes"
it would not have had a limiting effect.
(d) In Sharp v. Fowler, 151 Tex. 490, 252 S.W.2d 153 (1952), an interesting fact
situation occurred. In effect the transaction was: (i) 0 to A deed of Blackacre
with reservation of all the minerals to 0, (ii) 0 to A all the minerals from Blackacre, (iii) A to X, an undivided Y of the minerals from Blackacre, and (iv) A to
B, a deed describing Blackacre with a reference back stating "being the same land
described in [deed (i) ]." Query who owned the remaining Y4 mineral interest?
Held: Although deed (i) only operated to convey the surface and not the minerals
in Blackacre, the reference back was to the physical dimensions of the land and not
to the interest conveyed. B won.
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an undivided one-half interest.
The form of the recital also may create a situation in which afteracquired title might pass where not subjectively intended by the
grantor." In the above hypothetical situation A in his deed to B could
make a reference back as "being the same property described in the
deed from 0 to A" which may be construed as enlarging the granting
clause to include the entire interest.
Obviously if the draftsman"7 feels called upon to incorporate descriptions from deeds appearing in the prior chain of title, the recitations should be so limited, i.e., "reference is here made to the metes
and bounds description of said land as contained in the ded from
A to B and for no other purpose," and intentions should be clearly
set forth where references to limit the property conveyed as to
source, interest, or quality are desired.
G. Remote Grantees
The so-called doctrine of inurement deals with the question of
remote grantees who will benefit by or acquire a grantor's afteracquired title.8 Early cases" in the United States treating afteracquired title as an incident to an enforceable covenant of warranty
were met by the rule of law that a chose in action was non-assignable
and therefore only the immediate grantee and not his remote successors would have a right to acquire the after-acquired title.
Although the early Texas cases often applied a covenant theory
to pass an after-acquired title, in only a few of the cases did the
86 Sharp v. Fowler, note 85 supra.
87 Since deliberate (or inadvertent)

use of reference words like "described,"

"convey,"

"for all purposes," etc. may cause or alleviate (as the case may be) a breach of warranty
on the part of the grantor, the draftsman and interested parties should use due caution in
the preparation and examination of instrumentation of real property transactions to determine that they reflect the true intent of the parties. It would seem the phrase "weasel
words" is an unfortunately apt definition of words as these.
s8The AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.21, at 847-48, states the doctrine of inurement as follows:
[I]t must be considered on the basis of decisions or dicta to be the rule in
most states that a conveyance which will create an estoppel to assert an afteracquired title will transfer it and vest the legal title in the grantee or his successors.
. . . It is said that the title vests by operation of law, or by inurement,
as soon as it is acquired by the grantor, without the need of judicial assistance.
Where the doctrine is in force, as now appears to be the case in most states,
it applies irrespective of how the subsequent title is acquired other than from
the grantee or those claiming under him and regardless of whether the grantor
assumed to convey that which he did not own by mistake or by fraud. It
operates not only in favor of the grantee but for the benefit of any person
claiming title under him by any form of transfer, and binds not only the
grantor but his heirs or donees and also purchasers from him who have notice
of the conveyance which gives rise to the right.
89Lewis v. Ridge, Court of Common Pleas, Cro. Eleg. 863 (1601), Jordan v. Chambers,
226 Pa. 573, 75 A. 956 (1910). Also see discussion and cases called in RAWLE, ch. 11, and
BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL, ch. 11 (5th ed. 1876).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:97

court discuss the manner in which a remote grantee acquired the
right. The statement is merely made that parties to the deed and
their privies of estate and blood are bound as to any after-acquired
title, which passes "eo instanti" to the remote grantee.
The common law rule prohibiting assignment of choses in action
has never been in force in Texas, "° and, indeed, no case dealing with
after-acquired title makes reference to the rule. Although the right
to acquire an after-acquired title was sometimes treated as a contractual right passing to remote grantees by successive assignment,
the courts have not discussed the question of the form necessary to
assign the chose. If treated merely as a personal right it would
not pass under a deed dealing only with land, and a separate assignment would be necessary. However, it is implicit in the warranty
cases that any instrument sufficient to purport to convey the land
also effects an assignment of the chose. It may be therefore concluded
that this contractual right is deemed to be sufficiently "concerned"
with the land as to be considered an incorporeal interest in land so as
to pass under the terms of a deed.
The early courts were momentarily concerned with the nature of
the right that the remote grantee acquired, and some cases like
Gould v. West,"5 the court partially basing its decision on the covenant of further assurance, notes that equity would bind the heirs to
make further assurance, indicating that the right is in the nature
of specific performance to compel a conveyance. Such result would
be consistent with the covenant approach. However, by 1897 in
Baldwin v. Root the court indicated otherwise. "9'
"°Lakeview Land Co. v. San Antonio Traction Co., 95 Tex. 252, 66 S.W. 766 (1902);
Cleveland v. Heidenheimer, 92 Tex. 108, 46 S.W. 30 (1898); Ogden v. Slade, 1 Tex. 13
(1874); Hale v. Hollon, 36 S.W. 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896), aff'd, 90 Tex. 427, 39 S.W.
287 (1897).

91 32 Tex. 339 (1869).
0990 Tex. 546, 40 S.W. 3, 5-6 (1897):
There is considerable conflict in the authorities upon the question whether
the title acquired by one who had previously conveyed the same land with
covenants of warranty vests in the warrantee at the time that such title is
subsequently acquired by the warrantor, or gives a right to the warrantee to
have the subsequently acquired title transferred to him. This conflict grows
largely out of the technical rules of the common law upon the subject of
covenants in the different kinds of conveyances; which rules are in force in
some jurisdictions and in others they are not, and the decisions upon this
question in the different courts depend largely upon whether the technical
rules referred to are observed by the court or disregarded. In this State the
subejct is regulated by statute, so far as the covenants which the law implies
from the use of certain language are concerned. The rule most consistent with
our system of laws upon this subject is that when one conveys land by warranty of title or in such manner as to be estopped to dispute the title of his
grantee, a title subsequently acquired to that land by the grantor will pass eo
instanti to his warrantee, binding both the warrantor and his heirs and subsequent purchasers from either.
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When the court applies an estoppel basis for passing after-acquired
title, the right of the grantee is derived from the inability of the
original grantor, or his privies, to claim title under the instrument
executed. An after-acquired title not subject to claim by the grantor
vests immediately in the grantee or his successors.
Differences exist as to enforceable rights of a person having only a
contractual right to acquire land and one owning either an equitable
or legal title. The former has only a right of specific enforcement
which may be subject to the four-year statute of limitations as to
the time in which such actions may be brought; on the other hand,
the latter's right is to sue for title, generally by a suit in trespass to
try title, which title is subject to being lost only under the three, five,
ten, or twenty-five-year adverse possession statutes."a These and
other differences could have been significant in the after-acquired
title situation, as they had been in other areas; however, Baldwin
extinguished the possible differences based on rationale and the right
of a grantee is apparently one for title, subject to the adverse possession statutes, and amenable to a suit in trespass to try title.
Consider the following situation: 0 conveys to A, at a time when
a one-half interest is outstanding in X. A conveys to B. B quitclaims
to C. 0 acquires X's interest.
What is the position of remote grantee C to acquire a right to afteracquired title through a quitclaim deed from B? If the grantor of
the quitclaim deed B is considered to own a contractual right, (i.e.,
warranty cases) to acquire an after-acquired title, such chose in Texas
is impliedly considered as an incorporated interest in the land so as to
pass under the terms of the quitclaim deed.
However, if an estoppel theory is used, does the right of B to O's
after-acquired title pass to C? It may be contended once a right
'aSee text accompanying note 6 supra. Cf. Deaton v. Rush, 113 Tex. 176, 252 S.W.
1025 (1923) (equitable right); Covey v. Knight, 215 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948)
(equitable title); and TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5518 and 5535 (1925).
The nature of a grantee's right to an after-acquired title will determine the form of
action used to acquire such title and the limitation period in which such right may be lost.
If 0 has no title and A is deemed to have an equitable right to acquire an after-acquired
title of A, A will have four years, from the time A knew or should have learned of O's
acquisition, to sue for specific performance of his contract right. Article 5829. However,
this statute is tolled by certain disabilities, including coverture. Article 5535. A's right can
not be lost by adverse possession under the three, five, or ten-year statutes, for until the
contractual right is enforced, no "cause of action shall have accrued" to A as required
under these statutes. A may lose his right under the twenty-five-year statute. Article 5519.
However, the cases construing the statute have been inconsistent. Whitaker, The TwentyFive Year Statute of Limitations, 10 BAYLOR L. REV. 196 (1958).
If A sues in trespass to try title he will surely lose, for until title is acquired by A he
cannot support the action.
On the other hand if title (legal or equitable) passes to A, by estoppel or equitable
conversion, he may sue directly in trespass to try title and is not subject to the above mentioned four-year statute of limitation.
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of after-acquired title is created in B by estoppel that the right of inurement to C is in the nature of a chose in action and is an assignable
right by quitclaim deed."
However, can it be argued that if B later acquires the interest by
conveyance from X that it will pass to C? Surely not on an estoppel
basis, for B has never purported to convey the land to C. It should
follow logically that C's right would not be strengthened if B
acquires the remaining interest by inurement from 0. Under the
estoppel rationale a grantee's right, if any, depends upon a denial of
the grantor to claim rather than the creation of an enforceable contractual right in the grantee. The latter may be assignable as a chose
in action but it is hard to reach the same conclusion as to the former.
III.

AFTER-ACQuIRED TITLE AND THE TEXAS RECORDING ACTS

A. Operation of the Recording Acts
It is a familiar rule of common law that a later purchaser of a legal
title will take free of undisclosed equities. Assume that 0 conveys
to A by deed purporting to convey Blackacre (which A does not
record) at a time when 0 does not have title, but which he later
acquires. Under the covenant theory A would have a right of specific
performance against 0. However, if 0 later conveys Blackacre to B
for value without actual notice of A's deed, B by acquiring legal title
will cut off A's equitable right to acquire title."
However, if the court proceeds on a theory of estoppel (or, on a
contractual theory where it is held that upon 0 acquiring title, by
equitable conversion it passes to A)" A would have at least an equit-

able title, and since it is now embodied in the prior deed it may be
"4Few Texas cases are found on the question, but those on point indicate that afteracquired title will inure through a later quitclaim deed without discussion of rationale.
Henderson v. Little, 248 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e., stated
that after-acquired title passes from the grantor acquiring such title and all in privity with
grantor likewise are estopped to deny the recitals in the grantor's deed, Box v. Lawrence, 14
Tex. 545 (1855), states that recitals in a deed binding both parties thereto and their privies
"in blood, in estate, and in law," to same effect Hardy v. DeLeon, 5 Tex. 211 (1849), states
that after-acquired title is based on estoppel and exists in all cases as against a grantor and
subsequent purchasers from him with notice that of the prior conveyance.
The case of Saunders v. Flanniken, 77 Tex. 662, 14 S.W. 236 (1890), contains dicta to
the effect that after-acquired title will pass through a quitclaim deed to a remote grantee
and, although such a fact situation was involved in this case no discussion of the point was
made. The case of Barfield v. Belcher Land Mortgage Co., 257 S.W. 1095 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1924), implies that a valid quitclaim deed will pass after-acquired from a former
warranty deed and that the right of inurement will pass through the quitclaim deed.
Few cases have been found either discussing the situation or containing a situation where
the facts involved the right of inurement to remote grantees; however, no Texas cases have
been found denying such a result.
" Coker v. Roberts, 71 Tex. 597, 9 S.W. 665 (1888); Reeves v. Shook, 225 S.W. 429
(Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
soAckerman v. Smiley, 37 Tex. 211 (1872).
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treated as legal. This apparently is the result in Texas in covenant
rationale cases subsequent to Baldwin v. Root.
Articles 6626"7 and 66279" deal with the effect of recording of certain written instruments dealing with real property in Texas. Briefly
article 6626 enumerates a wide variety of instruments affecting real
property that may be recorded. Recording under this article merely
gives notice to persons of the existence of the instrument, but does
not change the effect at common law.
Article 6627, however, has the important result of changing the
common law effect upon recordation of instruments enumerated in
the statute. For instance, at common law if X conveyed legal title to
Y by deed, which was not recorded, and X subsequently conveyed
legal title by deed to Z, a bona fide purchaser for value without notice
of Y's deed, Y would prevail, as the purchaser of later legal title could
not cut off a prior legal title, recorded or not. Likewise it was held
that M, a judicial creditor, could catch by his lien only the interests
owned by a debtor at the time the lien was affixed, and M would not
catch land conveyed by prior unrecorded deed to L. By article 6627
it was made possible for Z by deed and, M by affixing his lien to take
free of unrecorded conveyances of legal title, contrary to the common law result. However, if an interest is construed as not being
within the scope of article 6627 (as are certain equitable interests),
the common law rules of priority will still apply.9
It therefore follows that in the first example, regardless of the
theory of the court as to the nature of A's rights to after-acquired
title, if A does not give notice to B of A's prior conveyance, B may
prevail. If A's right is treated as an equitable right to acquire title, B
may win as a bona fide purchaser of the legal title without notice of
the prior equity; or if A's right is treated as becoming legal, upon O's
later acquisition of title, A may lose his prior legal title by virtue of
article 6627.
97

TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6626 (1960).
9STEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6627 (1960):
When sales, etc., to be void unless registered. All bargains, sales and other conveyances whatever, of any land, tenements and hereditaments, whether they
may be made for passing any estate of freehold of inheritance or for a term
of years; and deeds of settlement upon marriage, whether land, money or other
personal thing; and all deeds of trust and mortgages shall be void as to all
creditors and subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice,
unless they shall be acknowledged or proved and filed with the clerk, to be
recorded as required by law; but the same as between the parties and their
heirs, and as to all subsequent purchasers, with notice thereof or without
valuable consideration, shall be valid and binding.
" Shear v. Currie, 295 F. 841 (5th Cir. 1924), (vendor's lien); Johnson v. Darr, 114
Tex. 516, 272 S.W. 1098 (1925) (oral express trust); Blankenship v. Douglas, 26 Tex. 225
(1862) (resulting trust). But cf.: Bowles v. Belt, 159 S.W. 885, (Tex. Civ. App. 1913)
error ref. (vendor's lien).
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On the other hand, B may take subject to A's prior conveyance if
he has actual notice thereof or is charged with constructive notice by
reason of A's occupancy and possession. Constructive notice may normally also be given by a grantee recording his deed; however, in the
factual context of after-acquired title a serious question arises as to
the effect of A's recording his deed from 0.

B. The Scope Of Search Doctrine As Limiting The Effect Of The
Recording Acts
If A records after the record reflects 0 to have acquired title and
before B buys, there should be no question that B is subject to A's
deed. What, however, if A records, but before 0 acquires a title?
The question has been authoritatively answered °in Texas only in the
instance where the grantor 0 is the sovereign.i'
Most jurisdictions have enacted statutes declaring the effect of a
properly recorded instrument, in so far as it may thereafter operate
to charge persons with notice of the contents of the instrument. In
Texas, article 6646 declares that a properly recorded instrument shall
be "notice to all persons of the existence of such grant, deed, or instrument."
The obvious question is whether the statute means what it says.
For instance, is E in Maine charged with notice of recorded instruments affecting title to Blackacre in Texas? The answer is that "it
depends." On what? Generally it depends upon whether E is dealing
with the title to Blackacre. If so, is E charged with notice of all recorded instruments appertaining to Blackacre? Assume in the chain
of title we find the situation where R has conveyed to S who did not
record, and S conveyed to T, who did record. Is E, a prospective purchaser from R, charged with notice of the senior chain of title? The
obvious answer to the stated obvious question is that the statute does
not mean what it says, or rather it has been judicially glossed so that
the statute concludes only those persons dealing with instruments that
may be easily found as to a particular title. This judicial limitation of
the notice statute is commonly referred to as the "scope of search"
or "chain of title" doctrine.
A literal application of the latter phrase will result in a rather
mechanical approach leading to the result that a recorded instrument
'°Borroum v. Culmell, 90 Tex. 93, 37 S.W. 313 (1896); Gould v. West, 32 Tex. 339
(1869); Williams v. Cook, 282 S.W. 574 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926); Houston Oil Co. v.
Reese Corrcher Lumber Co., 181 S.W. 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) error ref.; Breen v.
Morehead, 126 S.W. 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910), aff'd, 104 Tex. 254, 136 S.W. 1047
(1911); Von v. Denson, 120 S.W. 1020 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909); Simon v. Stearns, 43 S.W.
50 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897), error ref.; Dupree v. Frank, 39 S.W. 994 (Tex. Civ. App.
1897).

1966]

AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE

will not be notice to subsequent purchasers (herein used to denote
all persons who may later deal with the title) unless it can be "connected" with the title. The "no lead-in" example above exemplifies
this result.
On the other hand, the first phrase implies that a subsequent purchaser is concluded by notice of recorded instruments only if he is
bound to search for them. Conversely stated, if it be decided that the
recording of an instrument shall constitute notice to subsequent purchasers, they are bound to search for it. This is well stated by the
supreme court in the case of Leonard v. Ben ford Lumber Co.'
The literal terms of articles 6842 and 6857 would require that all persons be held to know what appears on the face of a duly recorded instrument. However, our statutes bear a settled construction, under which
registration of an instrument carries notice of its contents only to those
bound to search for it, among whom are subsequent purchasers under
the grantor in the recorded instrument.

The difference between the "no lead-in" deed and the prior recorded deed of A in the after-acquired title situation is that with
reference to the official records (i.e., county clerks office etc.) the
"no lead-in" deed cannot be found even if searched for, although the
same is not true with the deed from 0 to A. The reason for this, of
course, is due to the fact that deed and related records are indexed
alphabetically by grantor and grantee names, and not by property description. This means to find the conveyances out of 0, one must start
with the date upon which 0 finally parted with title (or the present
date if he still owns it) and search backwards chronologically, in the
"reverse" or "grantee" index to deeds until the deed into 0 is found.
One then switches to the "direct" or "grantor" index under O's
name, as of the date of the deed into 0,"1' and searches 0 as a grantor
chronologically forward to the date 0 divested.. himself of title.
101110 Tex. 83, 216 S.W. 382, 384 (1919).
102 The execution date of the deed, not the date of recordation.
103 Since recordation of an instrument by one in the junior chain of title cannot constitute constructive notice to the senior chain, White v. McGregor, 92 Tex. 556, 50 S.W.
564 (1899), the forward point of search as to any grantor would be the date of recordation
of title out of any such grantor. As a practical matter the forward point of search as to
each grantor is the date of search. This does not arise from any constructive notice by an
instrument recorded after the deed out of the grantor, but is due to the fact that under
article 6627 the junior chain taker does not have to record to win.
For example: 0 conveys to A who waits three days to record and in the interim 0 sells
to B who takes for value without actual notice of the deed to A. As article 6627 is a "notice"
type recording statute rather than a "race" or "grace period" type statute, B wins. B then
waits four years and records. Any attorney examining the records for a proposed purchase
from A must look for a possible deed to B. Houston Oil Co. v. Niles, 225 S.W. 604 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1923). The recording by B adds nothing in perfecting his title as to A (it
stops 0 from selling to C) but, if found, notifies the attorney A has no title. Although
this situation depends on a hiatus between delivery of A's deed and recordation, most titles
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Obviously the "no lead-in" deed of S to T will never be found from
these indices, unless one knows about the deed from R to S. Also,
unless one searches the grantor index for deeds out of 0 prior to the
date 0 acquired title, the prior recorded deed of A will never be
found.
Assuming that our hypothetical purchaser has a premonition of
A's deed and wishs to search for it, how far back must he look? To
this question there is no answer, how old is 0? From a practical
standpoint a period of some thirty to fifty years should be searched
in order to give a feeling of security.
It is at this point that the wording of article 6646 and the so-called
scope of search doctrine collide. Since the deed from 0 to A can be
found, should it be looked for? Article 66646 says "yes." However, as
this would apply to each grantor in the chain of title, would this not
constitute a practical impossibility viewed with relation to the manner of indexing and search of the official records?
As mentioned above, the Texas courts have authoritatively solved
this conflict only in regard to the factual situation of title out of the
State of Texas. It has been repeatedly held that a subsequent purchaser need not search for instruments as to particular land recorded
prior to the origin or inception of title from the sovereign. These
include cases of deeds made and recorded prior to the date of issuance
of land certificates subsequently located on and patent issued to the
land described;'- prior to entry of H and W, where land later is
acquired under homestead laws;a. prior to the execution of an application to purchase state lands,"'0 etc. It is obvious that these cases
constitute a further gloss on the wording of article 6646, for the
prior conveyance in each instance could be found.
contain many such instruments. Again an abstract of title, indexed by land description, will
contain B's deed.
Although deeds recorded in the junior chain are not constructive notice to later purchasers in the senior chain, the interaction of after-acquired title and the recording acts
has produced some weird results. In the case of Caswell v. Llano Oil Co., 120 Tex. 139,
36 S.W.2d 208 (1931), 0 executed a deed of trust to Bank, recorded; then he executed an
oil and gas lease, recorded; the deed of trust was foreclosed to X who sold to 0; 0 then sold
to Y. The recordation of the lease was held to be constructive notice to Y. This results from
the senior chain after-acquired title being fed to the lessee upon O's reacquisition. It can be
strongly argued that if the lease were unrecorded the lessee should have an option whether to
accept the later title, where the effect is to switch lessee's chain of title from junior to
senior, for here if the lease were unrecorded Y would win!
No cases are found in Texas dealing with the election of the grantee to accept the afteracquired title, and, of course, if the courts treat the right of inurement as a rule of property
no right of election would exist.
4
' Breen v. Morehead, 126 S.W. 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910), aff'd, 104 Tex. 254, 136
S.W. 1047 (1911).
"'See Leonard v. Benford Lumber Co., 110 Tex. 83, 216 S.W. 382 (1919), and cases
cited therein.
"' Simon v. Stearns, 43 S.W. 50 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) error ref.
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C. Breen v. Morehead and Progeny

The unsettled question in Texas is whether the scope of search
doctrine will be applied to conveyances in the derivative title. Although Texas has been cited as answering this question "yes," the
authority cited is Breen v. Morehead," which factually dealt with
conveyances out of the sovereign. Few Texas cases have been found
dealing with the question and it may never be answered. Abstractors
generally prepare the index of instruments to be included in an abstract from their own records of instruments, which are posted or
filed chronologically by property description. Due to the different
manner of search, O's prior deed to A would be included in the
abstract (as in fact would the "no lead-in" instruments) so that
a purchaser relying on an abstract examination would have actual
notice of these instruments.
However, be that as it may, the rule elsewhere is generally that one
need not search for conveyances, etc. made by a grantor prior to the
date it is shown that he acquired title." 8
The early Texas case of Hale v. Hollon'0 ' would not so restrict the
operation of what is now article 6646, and in answering the question
of practical impossibility the court of appeals stated:
We do not think that the duty of search for incumbrance or deed
commences at the time of inheritance of title in the vendor, as was held
in Calder v. Chapman, 52 Pa. St. 359, when the prior deed was with
warranty, and binding upon the vendor and his privies. It may be
troublesome to search the records, but that would not excuse a want of
search when the statute authorized the recording of the conveyance.
The statute authorizing its registration, the consequences of registration
must follow, in favor of the vendee who is vigilant and complies with
the law.110
Strangely this case has been neither cited nor followed on this
point. The leading case in Texas on this issue is the above mentioned
case of Breen v. Morehead,.. which dealt with title out of the sovereign. However, the language of both the court of civil appeals and
the supreme court is broader than the decision. The lower court
stated:
It is the rule that, if the subsequent purchaser of an after-acquired
title has received no notice of the prior deed, the estate in his hands is
... Breen v. Morehead, 126 S.W. 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910), aff'd, 104 Tex. 254, 136
S.W. 1047 (1911).
108 See case collected III AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 15.22, at 850 nn. 6-8.
109 36 S.W. 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896), aff'd, 90 Tex. 427, 39 S.W. 287 (1897).
" Hale v. Hollon, 36 S.W. at 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).
.. Breen v. Morehead, 126 S.W. 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910), aff'd, 104 Tex. 254, 136
S.W. 1047 (1911).
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freed from the estoppel. Shaw v. Beebe, 35 Vt. 205; Thistie v. Buford,
50 Mo. 278; Rawle Coy. Til. 427. But the question whether the registration of the prior deed, before the title had been acquired by the
grantor and recorded, is constructive notice of estoppel, seems to be a
doubtful one. It is said by Mr. Tiedeman on Real Property, § 515:
"It is certainly in violation of the spirit of the registration laws, which
only require the investigator to search the records for any incumbrance
or conveyance which occurs between the time when the grantor
acquired the title, and the time when he offers the title for conveyance. n 2
The supreme court further comments:
This brings us to the question whether it was the duty of those who
bought from McKelligon, without any notice of the deed to Breen for
a valuable consideration paid, to look beyond the origin of McKelligon's
title to ascertain the fact of previous sale to Breen. The rule of law
which governs such transactions is stated thus by Mr. Tiffany in his
work on Real Property (volume 1, sec. 476, p. 1080): "A purchaser is
not, as a general rule, charged with notice of a conveyance which is of
record, even though made by a person in the chain of title, unless it was
made by such person after the time at which the records show him to
have obtained the title, that is, the purchaser is not bound to search the
records to determine whether any particular person in the chain of title,
previous to obtaining the title, had done any acts which would affect
the title."
Mr. Pomeroy in his Equity Jurisprudence (volume 2, § 658, p. 1133)
states the same rule in this language: "How far back is a purchaser
bound to search the record title of his own vendor? If the records show
a good title vested in the vendor at a certain date, and nothing done by
him after that time to impair or incumber the title, it would seem that
the policy of the registry acts is thereby accomplished; the purchaser
is protected; he is not bound to inquire farther back, and to ascertain
whether the vendor has done acts which may impair his title prior to
the time at which it was vested in him as indicated by the records.
Now let us suppose that Mr. Kern had undertaken to investigate the
matter as to what might have transpired anterior to the sale by the
State to McKelligon. If he must look beyond the origin of the title
under which he was purchasing, then how far should he follow that
record back in the course of time in order to determine whether
McKelligon had made a previous sale of that land? If required to go
beyond the origin of the title, there could be no limit short of the
vendor's life, and such requirement of purchasers would involve land
titles in such uncertainty that it would be impracticable to rely upon
any investigation.
We believe that the rule stated above, that the date when the title
originated in McKelligon marked the limit of investigation for previous
12

Breen v. Morehead, 126 S.W. 650, 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910).
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sales or incumbrances of that tract of land by McKelligon, should be
applied here."'
There is no doubt that this is dicta expounded beyond the factual
context of Breen. However, the statements quoted are certainly broad
enough to support such an extension; and, it may be argued that the
court was making an application, rather than an extension, of what
they considered the rule as to vendor's generally, to the State as a vendor.
At least two subsequent cases have in part applied the dicta of
Breen, one being First National Bank of Chicago v. Southwestern
Lumber Co."4 which cited Breen in support of an opinion where a
recorded deed of trust with after-acquired property clause was held
inferior to an equitable lien upon later-acquired realty of the grantor
(the holding being predicated upon the major rationale of the property being charged with an equitable lien as it came into the hands
of the grantor) with the other being O'Neal v. Terry.. where the
court in a somewhat different fact situation treated a power of attorney in the derivative title as the "inception of title" in construing
article 6646.
Since article 6646 is no longer applied in a pristine state, it would
seem a slight extension of existing case law (if an extension at all) to
apply the scope of search limitation in article 6646 to each grantor
in the derivative chain.
The policy of the recording statutes to force men to divulge upon
the record all recordable interests claimed in real property is not aided
by doctrines giving notice effect to recorded interests not easily found.
An equity maxim states that loss between two innocent parties
should fall upon the one who could protect himself and did not. Although statutory interpretation is not generally regarded as being in
the province of equity, public policies by which statutes are judicially
glossed indeed are. A, at the time he acquired title, was charged with
notice that record title was not in 0. A's protection is to force the
recordation of the lead-in deed to 0, to complete his chain of title,
or, failing this, re-recordation following O's acquisition of title.

"'Breen v. Morehead, 104 Tex. 254, 257, 136 S.W. 1047, 1048-49 (1911).
11475 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1935).
115252 S.W.2d 1006 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
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